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Abstract 
Seminal conceptualizations of psychopathy include terms such as “moral insanity” and 
“without conscience”. Deficits in psychopathy seem to specific to moral transgressions (acts 
that have harmful consequences for others), as high levels of psychopathy do not impair 
detecting conventional transgressions (acts that violate social norms). Moral transgressions 
are not learned directly as social norms, demanding a sense of wrongness that seems 
compromised in psychopathy. Despite the accumulated knowledge providing support for this 
assumption, conceptual and methodological limitations are well documented in the literature. 
Several studies in the field are focused on moral development, moral foundations, and moral 
dilemmas but do not account for the heterogeneity of the psychopathic personality structure. 
Glenn and colleagues (2009) introduced sacredness as a relevant variable for moral behavior 
in psychopathy, that is, how much money would it take to commit an act that violates moral 
principles, assuming that no punishment or negative consequences would occur. Higher 
psychopathy scores predicted greater disposition to accept money to violate a moral 
foundation, with Factor 1 of psychopathy (manipulativeness, callousness, and lack of guilt or 
remorse) being the main predictor. In light of the Triarchic Model of Psychopathy, meanness 
and disinhibition may constitute the key phenotypic components to explain reduced 
sacredness. A sample of 388 participants completed the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure and a 
subset of Greene’s Moral Dilemmas that assess the endorsement of deontological vs. 
utilitarian reasons for moral judgment. After responding to the moral dilemmas, participants 
were asked to rate their moral choices on the degree of certainty and sacredness. 
Disinhibition predicted uncertainty in moral decision-making, providing further evidence for 
the assumption that impulsive individuals tend to act before thinking. Meanness and 
Disinhibition were both predictors of reduced sacredness. Callous traits, lack of empathy and 
emotional attachment, combined with reward seeking and difficulties in delaying gratification 
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may constitute the etiological path to explain a lower decision threshold that facilitates the 
instrumentally motivated violation of moral principles in psychopathy.  
Keywords: psychopathy, impulsivity, triarchic model, dilemmas, moral decision-
making. 
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Psychopathy and the sacredness of moral decision-making:  
insights from phenotypic components 
The conceptualization and definition of psychopathy is characterized by a 
longstanding and a controversial debate (Almeida et al., 2015; Skeem, Polaschek, Patrick, & 
Lilienfeld, 2011). From a clinical perspective, the diagnostic representation of psychopathy is 
captured by Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD; DSM-V section II). However, ASPD 
criteria has been recognized as inaccurate in describing psychopathy. The diagnosis of ASPD 
is mainly characterized by a configuration of observable behavior – externalizing and 
antisocial behavior – whereas underlying personality traits – the “core” features of 
psychopathy – are not required to meet diagnostic criteria (Venables et al., 2014). 
Consequently, there is an overestimation of psychopathy in criminal samples, and an 
underestimation in community samples. Given the limitations of categorical models, the 
conceptualization of psychopathy was recently redirected to dimensional models. The DSM-5 
Section III, as an emerging model, departs from the current criterion-based classification 
system of personality disorders and instead focuses on a hybrid system that emphasizes the 
dimensional traits. ASPD with Psychopathic Traits is conceptualized as a personality disorder 
characterized by low levels of anxiousness (Negative Affect domain) and withdrawal 
(Detachment domain) and high levels of attention seeking (Antagonism domain), which 
reflect a socially potent interpersonal style coupled with high stress immunity. These 
psychopathy traits reflect the fearless-dominance or boldness domain of psychopathy rooted 
in Cleckley’s (1941) original conceptualization (Patrick, 2006; Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 
2009; Skeem, et al., 2011). 
The Triarchic Model of Psychopathy (Patrick, et al., 2009) integrates boldness traits 
together with meanness and disinhibition. Boldness is defined as a capacity to maintain calm 
and to react with fearless toward stressful events. Meanness is characterized by a lack of 
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empathy, which includes callousness, small average of close relationships and an egocentric 
attitude. Disinhibition refers to a propensity to impulsive behavior, which is marked by a lack 
of control, planning, and foresight. Disinhibition and meanness are associated with 
externalizing vulnerability, whereas low fear is the etiological pathway of meanness and 
boldness. 
Amoral behavior is one of the principal characteristics of psychopathy (Glenn, Iyer, 
Graham, Koleva, & Haidt, 2009; Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman, 2012). “Moral 
insanity” and “without conscience” (Cleckley, 1941; Hare, 1999) are terms systematically 
used in the literature to describe psychopathy. Blair (2007) suggested that deficits in 
psychopathy are specific to moral transgressions (acts that have harmful consequences for 
others), as psychopaths are capable of detecting conventional transgressions (acts that violate 
social norms). Moral transgressions are not learned directly as social norms, demanding a 
sense of badness that seems compromised in psychopathy.  
Given the critical role of emotion in moral judgment and striking social/emotional 
deficits observed in psychopaths, one might expect to find more utilitarian judgment in 
individuals with high psychopathic traits. However, the results are not consistent. Using 
moral dilemmas, some empirical studies have supported this assumption (Bartels & Pizarro, 
2011; Gao & Tang, 2013; Landon & Delmas, 2012; Koenigs et al., 2012), whereas others 
have failed to find the association between psychopathy and utilitarian preferences (Cima, 
Tonnaer, & Houser, 2010; Pujol et al., 2011). A recent meta-analysis documented that results 
are significant but small in magnitude (r = .16; Marshall, Watts, & Lilienfeld, 2016). 
Therefore, and despite the accumulated knowledge, conceptual and methodological 
limitations may explain controversial findings. 
First, Glenn et al. (2009) proposed that differences between psychopaths and non-
psychopaths may be explained by the moral context of decision, such as the presence of 
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nonmoral rewards to disregard moral principles. Glenn and colleagues (2009) introduced 
sacredness as a relevant variable for moral behavior in psychopathy, that is, how much 
money would it take to commit an act that violates moral principles, assuming that no 
punishment or negative consequences would occur. Higher psychopathy scores predicted 
greater disposition to accept money to violate a moral foundation, supporting the hypothesis 
that the impaired decision-making of psychopathic individuals may be partly a result of a 
motivational imbalance that involves enhanced sensitivity to reward (i.e., money) and 
reduced sensitivity to punishment (i.e., consequences of committing immoral acts). 
Furthermore, several studies do not account for the heterogeneity of the psychopathic 
personality structure. The probabilistic analysis of psychopathic traits may be more accurate 
to unveil specific correlates with moral decision-making, while accounting for opposite-
suppressive effects between distinct traits or psychopathic subtypes (Gao & Tang, 2013; 
Koenings et al., 2012). Indeed, the Factor 1 of psychopathy (manipulativeness, callousness, 
and lack of guilt or remorse) was the main predictor of reduced sacredness while assessing 
moral foundations (Glenn et al., 2009), which is line with the findings that low-anxious 
individuals show more utilitarian preferences (Koenings et al., 2012). Neverthless, Gao and 
Tang (2013) reported that externalizing traits are the main predictors of utilitarian 
preferences. 
The Triarchic Model of Psychopathy is a promising dimensional approach to the 
study of moral decision-making in psychopathy. However, to our knowledge, none study to 
data used the triarchic conceptualization of psychopathy to test moral decision-making. The 
main goal of the present study is to capture the differences in moral decision-making across 
the distinct the phenotypic expressions of psychopathy, extending previous dimensional 
research and providing a comprehensive model of psychopathy and morality.  Given the 
association with emotional and behavioral disruptive features of psychopathy, meanness and 
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disinhibition may constitute the key phenotypic components to explain reduced sacredness 
and certainty underlying utilitarian preferences.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via e-mail and voluntarily agreed to participate in the 
online survey by accept the terms of the informed consent. Participants younger than 18 years 
and other nationality than Portuguese were excluded. A final sample of 388 participants (67% 
female) was included in the current study. Participants had ages between 18 and 59 (M = 
24.6, SD = 7.56). The years of education ranged between 11 and 23 (M = 15.14, SD = 2.75). 
Measures 
Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM). Self-report measure (Patrick, 2010; 
adapted by Vieira et al., 2014) that operationalizes the Triarchic Model of Psychopathy, by 
dividing its 58 items in three subscales (Boldness, Disinhibition, and Meanness subscales). 
The TriPM taps psychopathic traits as continuously distributed in the general population. 
Moral Dilemmas Sacredness. This measure was developed based on Greene Moral 
Dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001) and Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale. The impersonal set 
of Greene’s dilemmas presents two undesirable alternatives, but the participant is not directly 
involved in the moral action. The decrease in emotion activation during the processing of 
impersonal dilemmas will allow the cognitive system to drive rational utilitarian decision 
making (i.e., maximizing benefits and minimizing costs). The impersonal dilemmas are, 
therefore, highly relevant to psychopathy as elicit higher rates of utilitarian responses. For 
this reason, participants were firstly asked to answer to five impersonal Greene’s dilemmas 
and to quantify the degree of certainty while answering to each one of them (between 0, 20, 
40, 60, 80, and 100% of certainty). Afterwards, participants were asked to rate a modified 
version of Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) that allows 
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to indirectly quantify how much an individual values each foundation of morality by asking 
how much money it would take to commit actions that violate each of the foundations. 
Assuming no punishment or negative consequences from decision, the previous impersonal 
actions were presented to assess the shift in moral decision-making in the presence of a 
nonmoral incentive. Participants rated the previous decision from “I’d do it for free” (coded 
with 1) to “Never, for any amount of money” (coded with 0). 
Results 
Linear Regression Models were performed to explore the relationship between the 
core traits of psychopathy (boldness, disinhibition, and meanness) and decision-making, 
certainty, and sacredness while responding to impersonal dilemmas.  
Disinhibition (β = .19, p = .001) and meanness (β = .13, p = .022) were both 
predictors of utilitarian responses, F(1,387) = 9.21, p = .001, R2 = .067.  
Disinhibition (β = -.19, p = .001) significantly predicted uncertainty in moral decision-
making, F(1,387) = 6.916, p = .001, R2 = .051.  
Both meanness (β = .16, p = .004) and disinhibition (β = .22, p < .001) were found to 
be significant predictors of reduced sacredness, F(1,387) = 13.643, p < .005, R2 = .096. 
No other significant effects were found, namely regarding boldness. 
Discussion 
The main goal of the current study was to capture the differences in moral decision-
making across the distinct the phenotypic expressions of psychopathy. We hypothesized that 
meanness and disinhibition, as the emotional and behavioral correlates of antisocial 
expressions of psychopathy, would predict reduced sacredness and certainty underlying 
utilitarian preferences in impersonal moral dilemmas. 
Confirming our hypothesis, meanness and disinhibition were both predictors of higher 
rates of utilitarian preferences in response to impersonal moral dilemmas. In high-trait 
MORAL DECISION-MAKING AND PSYCHOPATHY                                                      		
 
38 
meanness and disinhibition, the decrease in emotion activation during the processing of 
impersonal dilemmas allowed the cognitive system to drive rational utilitarian decision 
making. Our results support a previous study. Gao and Tang (2013) reported that 
externalizing features of psychopathy were the main predictor of utilitarian responses in 
personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. In an opposite direction, Koenings and colleagues 
(2012) found that the preferences for utilitarian choices involving personal harm was 
restricted to low-anxious psychopaths. However, the sample from Koenings et al. (2012) 
study was recruited from an incarcerated sample and psychopathic traits were assessed by the 
Psychopathy Checklist Reviewed (PCL-R; Hare, 2003). Patrick and colleagues (2009) 
documented that PCL-R was operationalized in line with the concept of criminal 
psychopathy. Subsequently, disruptive traits are captured in a great extent by PCL-R than the 
adaptive features of psychopathy, in general, and in criminal samples, in particular. In fact, 
meanness and disinhibition are better represented in the PCL-R than boldness. Boldness is a 
close correlate of positive adjustment in psychopathy, capturing the adaptive features 
described by Cleckey (1941). In line with Gao and Tang (2013), results from fearlessness 
dominance facet of psychopathy, boldness traits were non-significant while explaining 
utilitarian preferences.  
Interestingly, disinhibition was associated with more uncertainty in moral decision-
making, suggesting that individuals with higher levels of disinhibition are less certain when 
making a decision directly related with moral values, supporting the assumption that 
impulsive individuals tend to act before thinking. Disinhibition traits may explain impulsive 
reactions to dilemmatic situations and, therefore, a weaker certainty in relation to the 
previous decision.  
Regarding sacredness, individuals scoring higher in meanness and disinhibition report 
that they would be willing to accept an amount of money to act in a utilitarian way and, 
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probably, to perform a behavior that violates their moral foundations when financially 
rewarded. In fact, the moral-decision making in meanness and disinhibition is utilitarian in 
nature, as documented by higher rates of utilitarian preferences. Our study highlights that 
utilitarian preferences may be instrumentally motivated. A nonmoral incentive, such as 
money, reinforces the utilitarian response in high meanness and disinhibition traits. Glenn 
and colleagues (2009) also evidenced that manipulativeness, callousness, and lack of guilt or 
remorse traits of psychopathy (i.e., meanness) were the main predictors of reduced 
sacredness. Regarding disinhibition, the combination of reduced certainty and sacredness 
may indicate that individuals with higher levels of disinhibition are more susceptible of 
changing a decision directly related to moral values, once they are less certain of that decision 
and, simultaneously, they can have reduced sacredness, in function of environmental 
contingencies, namely financial rewards. These results evidence a motivational imbalance in 
callous-unemotional and externalizing features of psychopathy that involves enhanced 
sensitivity to monetary rewards or benefits (i.e, reward-seeking) and reduced sensitivity to 
punishment (i.e., consequences of committing immoral acts). The main findings highlight 
lower decision threshold in meanness and disinhibition traits that facilitates the violation of 
moral principles that are utilitarian in nature. 
In conclusion, our results extend previous research and provide a more comprehensive 
model of utilitarian preferences in psychopathy. The differential relationships between 
boldness and meanness-disinhibition further demonstrate that it is critical to disentangle 
personality constructs into narrower homogeneous components to fully understand the 
mechanism and processes underlying moral judgments in psychopathic individuals. 
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